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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  




This paper provides a cross-country analysis to determine whether CEO turnover is a credible 
disciplining device for managers, whether it is effective in delivering performance 
improvements, and whether better governance improves the credibility and effectiveness of CEO 
turnover. The analysis is based on a detailed panel of 5,300 CEO years and spans two distinctly 
different financial systems-the U.K. and Germany-over the period 1995-2005. We find that 
CEOs face a credible threat of being removed for underperformance and that the hiring of new 
CEOs is effective in realizing large profitability improvements in the following years. We also 
find both relations to be virtually identical in both countries, despite large structural governance 
differences. Further, we consider a large number of firm-specific governance mechanisms 
previously proposed as indicators of better governance and find no evidence that any of them 
improves the observed relations between firm performance and CEO turnover. Taken together, 
our results suggest that replacing the CEO is an important component of successful turnarounds 
in underperforming firms and that this economic mechanism appears to work in nearly identical 
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1. Introduction  
Corporate governance research is primarily concerned with mechanisms that align the interests 
of managers with those of shareholders. In that sense, governance mechanisms are aimed at 
ensuring a closer alignment of these interests. One of the main such mechanisms available to 
shareholders is the threat of replacing top management. To prevent performance declines, this 
threat needs to be credible: the likelihood that a CEO is replaced must increase as performance 
worsens. And, for CEO turnover to be effective, CEO replacement decisions need to yield 
performance improvements under the management of the new CEO. In this paper, we use a 
cross-country analysis to determine, first, whether CEO turnover is a credible threat and whether 
it is effective; and second, whether governance mechanisms influence the credibility and 
effectiveness of CEO turnover.  
In the U.S., there is strong evidence that the turnover threat is credible, (e.g. Warner et 
al., 1988, Weisbach, 1988, Denis et al., 1997, Huson et al. 2001, and Jenter and Lewellen, 2010). 
There is also some evidence that CEO replacement decisions are effective in U.S. firms (e.g. 
Bonnier and Bruner, 1989, Denis and Denis, 1995, and Hotchkiss, 1995). There is only weak 
evidence, however, that governance mechanisms affect both relations simultaneously, except for 
the specific case of outsider-dominated boards (Weisbach, 1988, and Huson et al., 2004).  
Outside the U.S., empirical research faces significant challenges. Typically, broad cross-
country studies of CEO turnover have short time series and lack important control variables, 
such as whether the CEO is monitored by an insider- or outsider dominated board, while single-
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country studies have to rely on small, often hand-collected samples.
1
 As CEO changes are 
relatively rare events, the importance of sample size is compounded.
2
 At the same time, it is 
crucial to understand the mechanisms of CEO turnover across financial systems, as shareholders 
everywhere face the need to align the interests of management with their own, and forced CEO 
turnover is one of the few governance mechanisms that are universally available. 
The goal of our paper is to use a large number of CEO turnover events from two 
distinctly different financial systems – the U.K. and Germany – to answer whether the threat of 
CEO turnover is credible and effective across countries and to shed light on whether or not 
governance improves the credibility and effectiveness of this threat. In doing so we rely on 
detailed and carefully hand-cleaned board data and matched firm-level governance data, which 
allows us to get very close to the state of the art in current U.S. turnover samples. The obvious 
price we pay for insisting on detailed firm-level data is that data collection costs limit our sample 
to just two countries. Our paper is not the first to provide CEO turnover evidence outside the 
U.S. There is prior evidence that the CEO turnover threat is credible elsewhere, but few papers 
consider simultaneously the firing and hiring decision as we do, none use similarly large board 
data panels and at the same time detailed firm-level governance data, and none explicitly rule out 
mean reversion of firm performance as an alternative hypothesis. Our sample spans the decade of 
1995-2005, and includes 5,300 CEO years and 812 CEO changes, for 723 U.K. and 309 German 
                                                          
1
 The first cross-country study of CEO turnover by Kaplan (1994a) uses a sample of 448 Japanese and 485 U.S. 
CEO-year observations. Global samples of CEO changes are used in Defond and Hung (2004) (3,179 firms), Gibson 
(2003) (1,204 firms) and Lel and Miller (2008) (19,091 firms), although the first two papers cover a time period of 
five years, which is shorter than the average tenure of a U.S. CEO of around six years. Significantly, none of these 
papers consider board characteristics, such as board size or number of outside directors, or CEO characteristics, such 
as age or whether the incoming CEO is an insider or outsider. In single-country studies, CEO turnover is analyzed 
for Germany in Kaplan (1994b) using 42 firms; in Koeke (2004), using 664 firms; for the U.K. in Dahya et al. 
(2002), using 460 firms; and Franks et al. (2001) using 243 firms. 
2
 Kaplan and Minton (2006) report an average CEO tenure of 5.7-6.4 years for the U.S. Similarly, we find an 
average CEO tenure of 6.8 years for the U.K. and 7.5 years for Germany. 
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firms. The size of our sample is comparable to the largest U.S. data sets of CEO turnover.
3
 
In our analysis, we find that CEO turnover is preceded by significant underperformance 
and followed by significant performance improvements. Governance mechanisms, in that sense 
perform a monitoring role, with respect to incumbent CEOs and oversee the selection of new 
CEOs, when such a decision is needed. 
Our analysis is based on both operating performance measures and market-based 
performance measures and our results obtain for all of them. We are careful to adjust for mean 
reversion in operating performance, i.e. the fact that poorly performing firms in a given year 
experience larger future performance gains on average. We perform this adjustment in two ways. 
First, we follow Barber and Lyon (1996) and measure performance changes against control 
groups, that experience similar poor performance but no CEO turnover. Second, we use a 
dynamic panel data approach as in Blundell and Bond (1998), and control for unobserved firm 
heterogeneity and time effects in testing for post turnover performance. Importantly, while we 
observe significant mean reversion in corporate performance, our results show that mean 
reversion is not driving our results. 
Surprisingly, the patterns of replacing a CEO in the event of poor performance, and 
realizing significant improvements in performance after a new CEO is appointed are virtually 
identical in the U.K. and in Germany. This is striking, since structural governance differences 
between the two samples are large. The U.K. represents a market-based system that shares most 
U.S. features - single tier boards, highly developed financial markets, firms that typically do not 
have blockholders, and few restrictions on corporate restructuring, including weak employment 
protection. Germany represents a relationship-based system and features mandatory two tier 
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 See Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Warner et al. (1988), Weisbach (1988), Bonnier and Bruner (1989), Denis and 




boards, less developed financial markets, significant importance of (relationship) banks, firms 
that typically have a large blockholder, and some of the strongest employment protection in 
developed markets.  
After establishing these baseline results, we proceed to test whether the relation between 
CEO turnover and firm performance is influenced by firm governance characteristics. We 
consider a large number of governance mechanisms previously proposed as important 
determinants of monitoring. We place space emphasis on board characteristics (board size, the 
percentage of outsiders on the board, the percentage of bankers on the board, CEO and Chairman 
separation), and shareholder characteristics (concentrated ownership and large blockholders, 
families, institutional shareholders). 
In a nutshell, we do not find evidence that governance characteristics are associated with 
the likelihood of either removing underperforming incumbent CEOs or with hiring better 
incoming CEOs. Instead, boards and shareholders act indiscriminately. Empirically this means, 
for example, that outsider-dominated boards are neither more likely to fire a CEO after bad 
performance than after normal performance, nor are they associated with the appointment of new 
CEOs that bring about larger gains in corporate performance. In short, governance mechanisms 
appear to be mostly irrelevant for the successful turnarounds that firms experience. Interestingly, 
the lack of significant effects is not specific to one of the two financial systems in our sample, 
despite their large differences. For example, we do not find evidence of a monitoring role of 
institutional investors in the U.K. or of family blockholders or bankers sitting on a firm’s board 
in Germany.  
We do, however, find more similarities between the U.K. and Germany: Successful 
turnarounds under the new CEO coincide with large asset sales and significant layoffs. Again, 
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the similarity of the results in both countries is remarkable, given that one might expect corporate 
restructuring in general and layoffs in particular to be more difficult to implement in Germany 
than in the U.K. Our evidence shows that this is not the case. Instead, incoming CEOs in both 
countries are able to implement significant downsizing plans. These are not only very similar 
between the two countries, but also similar to U.S. evidence[WE NEED A CITATION HERE]. 
The market for ‘company doctors’ hired as new CEOs also appears to be similar across 
countries. Like in the U.S., outside hires are rare and do not contribute to stronger downsizing, 
for example.  
One possible concern is that governance quality may affect the credibility and 
effectiveness of the CEO turnover threat, but our governance measures are mismeasured. We 
address this concern by showing that many of the governance parameters we consider do affect 
how frequently CEO turnover occurs and how performance changes following prior declines, 
consistent with prior U.S. evidence. These results confirm the relevance of the governance 
variables that we use. At the same time, they support the view that CEO turnover and 
performance are both related to firm-specific governance mechanisms, such as board 
composition. For example, firms with small, outsider-dominated boards have a higher likelihood 
of CEO turnover than firms with large, insider-dominated boards. These effects also filter 
through to performance changes under the new CEO: Firms with outsider-dominated boards 
experience larger improvements in performance than firms with insider-dominated boards. 
However, these effects affect all firms irrespective of their performance.  
Taken together, our results suggest that in times of crisis, the likelihood of a CEO being 
replaced increases and bringing in a new CEO causes a significant performance improvement. 
This economic mechanism appears to work in nearly identical ways in markets as similar as the 
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U.S. and the U.K. and in markets as different as the U.K. and Germany. The bright side of these 
results for shareholders is that CEOs that perform particularly poorly are generally successfully 
replaced, and existing governance mechanisms are collectively sufficient for this to happen.
4
 
However, the beneficial effects of CEO turnover do not result from any specific governance 
mechanism in isolation. 
 Our paper makes several contributions. First, we provide evidence that performance 
patterns around CEO turnover, that were shown for U.S. firms, also arise in other markets that 
lack the governance mechanisms that have been argued to determine performance around CEO 
turnover in the U.S. (as Germany does). They also arise in markets that do not lack the 
governance mechanisms, but the mechanisms are unrelated to firm performance around CEO 
turnover (as the evidence shows for the U.K.).  
Second, we provide evidence that the beneficial effects of outsider dominated boards in 
CEO replacement decisions observed in the U.S. do not extend to the U.K. Prior results on 
whether outsiders contribute to making the turnover threat credible have been conflicting (Dahya 
et al., 2002, and Franks et al., 2001). To resolve this, we use the most detailed data available to 
date to determine whether directors are outsiders and to show that, independent of how strict we 
are in classifying outsiders, they neither increase the credibility of the turnover threat, nor do 
they improve CEO appointment decisions. Our study provides a larger, more recent sample, with 
finer criteria of director independence assessment than prior research, and shows that the benefits 
of outside directors are less general than U.S. evidence suggests.  
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 Although we quantify a firm’s response to performance declines, we cannot observe whether underperforming 
CEOs are subject to pre-emptive firing, i.e. firing before performance declines. If firms with good governance 
always pre-emptively fire CEOs and firms with weak governance do not, then the lack of explanatory power of 
governance quality could be due to firings after performance declines only occurring in low quality governance 
firms, where governance is so weak that differences in quality are irrelevant. To rule out this concern we test for 
differences in governance quality between firms where CEO turnover occurs after normal performance and firms 
where CEO turnover occurs after underperformance; we do not find any such differences. 
7 
 
Third, we address the concern of mean reversion in our analysis of how effective CEO 
replacements are in turning around poorly performing firms. Since turnover occurs more 
frequently in cases of prior underperformance, neglecting mean reversion may overstate the 
performance benefits of CEO turnover. We adopt a dynamic panel data approach to address 
biases induced by unobserved firm heterogeneity and persistence in operating performance. Any 
unobserved firm characteristic that is positively related to both future performance and current 
CEO turnover leads to an overstatement of turnover-related performance benefits for poorly 
performing firms. To the best of our knowledge, this issue has not been addressed in the existing 
literature on post-turnover performance changes. 
Fourth, we provide the largest samples of CEO turnover for the U.K. and Germany so far, 
allowing us to address concerns of representativeness. Prior results for Germany in Kaplan 
(1994b) and for the U.K. in Franks et al. (2001) show no effect of the quality of governance on 
the sensitivity of CEO turnover to past performance. Our tests strongly support this and show no 
increase in the importance of governance quality in more recent data. 
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss related 
research and hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data used in our study and provides summary 
statistics. The empirical analysis and discussion of our results is contained in Section 4, and 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Related Research and Hypotheses 
In this section we review prior research regarding the relation of firm performance and 
governance around CEO turnover events and develop our hypotheses. 
Our basic premise follows Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), who propose a theoretical 
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framework in which the board acts in the interests of shareholders and monitors the CEO. 
Performance declines lead the board to update its information about the quality of the CEO and 
in turn raise the probability that the board appoints a new CEO, whose expected quality exceeds 
the incumbent CEO’s quality. In this setting, the threat of CEO replacement is both credible and 
effective.  
Empirical evidence confirms a credible threat in the U.S. Early studies by Coughlan and 
Schmidt (1985), Warner et al. (1988) and many later papers find a negative association between 
firm performance and management turnover. In the U.K., Dayha et al. (2002) and Franks et al. 
(2002) find a similar negative relation between firm performance and CEO turnover, while 
Kaplan (1994b) confirms the same pattern for CEOs in Germany. Similar results have been 
shown to arise in many other financial markets, which we do not review here for brevity.  
There is also evidence that CEO replacement decisions are effective in U.S. firms. Denis 
and Denis (1995), Denis and Kruse (2000) and Huson et al. (2004) document significant 
improvements in operating performance following the turnover. There is little or no prior 
evidence for either Germany or the U.K. about turnover effectiveness.  
What makes the threat both credible and effective? Technically, the board hires and fires 
the CEO and board independence is widely argued to be the key ingredient to boards removing 
underperforming CEOs. In addition, prior research has suggested board size and external 
mechanisms–monitoring by blockholders, price pressure from takeovers, and financial leverage–
as influencing the relation between CEO turnover and firm performance.  
Can firm-level governance be expected to work in identical ways across countries? A 
primary reason for focusing on U.K. and German firms is that institutional differences between 
the two countries are significant, which prior research has argued to affect firm-level 
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governance. Investor protection is stronger in the U.K. than in Germany. Similarly, financial 
development is high in the U.K. and low in Germany. Further, employment protection is weak in 
the U.K. and strong in Germany, creating presumably larger barriers against corporate 
restructuring and layoffs.
5
 If these institutional differences affect governance, they may also 
influence the relation between CEO turnover and performance. We discuss each of the internal 
and external mechanism mentioned above and expected country differences in turn. 
Independence: Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and many others argue that outside board 
directors are independent and play the role of monitors. This view has served as the basis of 
regulatory efforts internationally, including Sarbanes-Oxley in the U.S., the Cadbury Report in 
the U.K., and the Corporate Governance Code in Germany. Whether the board independence 
view applies is ultimately an empirical question and the evidence is mixed. In the U.S., outside 
directors have been shown to increase the sensitivity of turnover to past performance (see 
Weisbach, 1988, Borokhovich et al., 1996, Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). In the U.K., the evidence 
is ambiguous. Dahya et al. (2002) find a significant disciplinary role for outsider-dominated 
boards, while Franks et al. (2001) find no evidence of disciplining by outside board members. 
The latter authors suggest that regulatory differences between the U.S. and the U.K. may lead to 
the irrelevance of outsider board representation. In the U.S. directors have significant fiduciary 
obligations, whereas very few such obligations exist in the U.K. In Germany, supervisory board 
members have been argued to be either more or less independent than their U.S. counterparts 
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 At the beginning of our sample period in 1996, the antidirector rights index in Djankov et al. (2008) has a score of 
5 in the U.K. and 1 in Germany, out of a maximum of 6; while the anti self dealing index is 0.95 in the U.K. and 
0.28 in Germany, out of maximum of 1. Regarding financial development, stock market capitalization relative to 
GDP is 119.5 percent in the U.K. and 21.8 percent in Germany; the number of listed firms relative to the country's 
population (in billion) is 35.2 in the U.K. and 8.3 in Germany; and the number of initial public offerings per year 
relative to the stock of listed firms is 9.1 percent in the U.K. and 2.9 percent in Germany (World Development 
Indicators, 1997). Regarding employment protection, strictness of employment protection legislation is 0.6 in the 
U.K. and 2.5 in Germany, against an OECD average of 2.0 (OECD Employment Outlook, 2008); strictness of 
employment laws is 1.02 in the U.K. and 1.57 in Germany, against a global average of 1.58 (Botero et al., 2004). 
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(Roe, 1993, Fauver and Fuerst, 2006). If outsider dominated boards increase monitoring quality 
of boards, they should increase the sensitivity of turnover to past performance as well as lead to 
larger performance improvements following turnover. This conjecture applies to the U.K., but 
not to Germany, as the two-tier board structure of German firms does not allow to distinguish 
between insider and outsider dominated boards.  
Board size: Large boards have been argued to adversely affect monitoring quality, 
because of free riding problems (Jensen, 1993). Yermack (1996) finds that firms with smaller 
boards are more likely to discipline poorly performing managers in the U.S., while Dahya et al. 
(2002) confirm this finding for the U.K. All firms in our German sample are subject to 
codetermination rules. No prior evidence exists for Germany and the U.K. whether board size 
affects performance under the new CEO. If smaller boards lead to more effective monitoring, 
smaller boards should increase the sensitivity of turnover to past performance and lead to larger 
performance improvements following turnover. Because firm discretion over board size is by 
law more limited in Germany than in the U.S. or the U.K. any empirical relation is expected to 
be weaker.  
Monitoring by blockholders: Blockholders can potentially overcome free rider problems 
of monitoring and act as a disciplinary mechanism (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). U.S. evidence 
suggests that the presence of blockholders increases the likelihood of turnover (Denis et al., 
1997), and more strongly so in poorly performing firms after failed takeover bids (Denis and 
Serrano, 1996). Li and Srivnivasan (2011) find such disciplinary turnover is more pronounced in 
family firms. For the U.K. however, Franks et al. (2001) find no disciplinary effect of 
blockholders. For Germany, Kaplan (1994b) similarly does not identify any blockholder effect 
on turnover. Regarding post-turnover performance, Huson et al. (2004) find that institutional 
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shareholdings are associated with larger profitability gains. There is no prior evidence for post-
turnover performance for the U.K. and Germany. Under the view that blockholders act as 
disciplinary agents, they should increase the sensitivity of turnover to past performance and lead 
to larger performance improvements following turnover. Blockholders throughout our sample 
period are relatively rare in the U.K. and frequent in Germany (Faccio and Lang, 2002, Franks et 
al., 2012). If the effect of blockholders per se is similar across countries, one would therefore 
expect a higher sensitivity of turnover to past performance and larger performance improvements 
in Germany.  
Financial leverage: Debtholders may affect board firing and hiring decisions in two 
ways. First, Jensen (1986) argues that debt financing reduces free cash flow and therefore acts as 
a disciplinary device for managers. Second, banks providing debt financing may play an active 
monitoring role. Financing sources differ between Germany and the U.K., with bank financing 
playing a large role for German firms, often in the form of relationship banking (Franks and 
Mayer, 2001). In the U.K., debt is more likely to be public debt, while in Germany debt is more 
likely to assume the form of bank financing (Koeke, 2004). Leverage therefore might be 
expected to play a more important disciplinary role in Germany than in the U.K. 
In addition, and to observe bank relationships more directly, we try to measure the board 
monitoring performed by banks. The expected monitoring of bankers is ambiguous. On the 
bright side, bankers may act as active monitors, as they may wish to safeguard their existing 
loans and have access to better monitoring technology and information. On the dark side, they 
may be supporters of the incumbent CEO. The overall effect is therefore ambiguous. There is no 
prior evidence on the effect of bank representation on boards for CEO turnover decisions, for the 
U.K. and for Germany. We follow Dittmann et al. (2010) and use the percentage of bankers on a 
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firm’s board as an indicator of the intensity of bank monitoring.6 
Price pressure: The threat of a takeover may be sufficient to induce board members to 
preemptively discipline underperforming management (Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1994). Indeed, 
Mikkelson and Partch (1997) show that the sensitivity of turnover to performance in U.S. firms 
increases during periods of high takeover activity. More recently, however, this finding has been 
disputed by Huson et al. (2001). For the U.K., Franks et al. (2001) find no disciplinary effect of 
takeovers. For Germany, Koeke (2004) and Franks and Mayer (2001) find increased turnover 
following block transactions, but no evidence is provided on the relation to firm performance. 
Under the view that takeovers increase monitoring incentives for the board, stronger price 
pressure will increase the sensitivity of turnover to past performance and increase performance 
following turnover. Prior evidence by Franks and Mayer (2001) shows that takeovers are rarely 
hostile in Germany. Therefore, any disciplinary effect of takeovers is likely to be weaker. 
 
3. Sample and Summary Statistics 
Our sample ties together a number of different data sources. Firms are initially selected based on 
coverage by Compustat Global, which according to S&P covers 95% of total European market 
capitalization. Between 1995 and 2005, Compustat reports data on roughly 3,500 firms in the 
U.K. and 1,100 firms in Germany. These firms are matched with our primary data sources of 
board data, which is the electronic Manifest database for the U.K. and the annual hardcopy issues 
of Hoppenstedt for Germany. For both countries we restrict data to firms that enter Compustat 
until 1997, by the latest. From the matched sample of firms we eliminate private firms, 
investment trusts (SIC codes 61 and 62), firms for which board composition is missing and firms 
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 Data availability on bank financing or bank relationships for most of our sample firms is scarce. To illustrate, our 




that have coverage gaps. The final sample contains 723 firms for the U.K. and 340 firms for 
Germany. To illustrate coverage, we compare our sample with the total market capitalization of 
listed domestic companies reported by the Worldbank: In 1997 our sample represents 54 percent 
of total market capitalization in Germany, and 48 percent of total market capitalization in the 
U.K.  
 
3.1 Board data 
 Το construct CEO turnover measures that are consistent between countries, we treat the 
chairman of the management board (Vorstandsvorsitzender) in Germany as equivalent to the 
CEO in the U.K. Executive directors in the U.K. correspond to management board (Vorstand) 
members in Germany and nonexecutive directors in the U.K. correspond to supervisory board 
(Aufsichtsrat) members in Germany. 
We collect managerial turnover data by tracking firms over time in Manifest for the U.K. 
and in the annual issues of Hoppenstedt for Germany. CEO turnovers are classified into internal 
and external ones. Internal turnover for U.K. indicates that the CEO or Chairman resigns from 
his position, but stays on the board of directors, whereas external turnover means that they leave 
the board. Similarly, internal turnover for Germany indicates that the CEO or Chairman resigns 
from his position, but stays either on the management board or on the supervisory board. On top 
of this classification, we also classify whether the incoming CEO is externally hired, i.e. an 
outsider, or whether he or she previously worked for the firm. We take great care to correctly 
identify the relatively rare cases of true external appointment, by considering all prior positions a 
new CEO has had, including those that were below the board level. For this we review all 812 
turnover cases and obtain incoming CEOs’ biographies from BoardEx and complement them 
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with news searches on Factiva.
7
 
Under German corporate law, corporations are not required to have a CEO. While many 
firms choose to always appoint a CEO, some never choose to and some switch regimes over 
time. Under U.K. corporate law, corporations are required to have a CEO, but we observe firms 
without a CEO in some years. CEO changes therefore do not always correspond to true turnover 
events. We search all turnover event of on Factiva and eliminate events arising from firms 
switching regimes. 
We collect information on CEO and Chairman age using Manifest for the U.K. and 
Capital IQ, Factiva and annual reports for Germany. 
We record board size, the number of executive and nonexecutive directors and the names 
of CEO and Chairman on a yearly basis. For U.K. firms, we measure board size as the total 
number of executive and non executive directors reported by the Manifest database. For German 
firms we measure board size as the number of supervisory board members, reflecting the fact 
that management board directors do not participate in CEO dismissal and appointment decisions. 
Regarding board independence, we follow the U.K.'s Combined Code on Corporate Governance 
in classifying director independence.
8
  We construct three measures of board independence: The 
first relies on the firm’s report on the independence of each director, based on the U.K. 
Corporate Governance Code criteria. Since corporations can circumvent those criteria, our 
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 We do not perform event study analyses of CEO turnover announcement returns, because scarce news coverage on 
Factiva does not allow to reliably identify the earliest announcement date for the majority of CEO turnovers in 
Germany. 
8
 The U.K. Combined Code on Corporate Governance classifies a director as dependent if he or she i) has been an 
employee of the company or group within the last five years; ii) has had, within the last three years, a material 
business relationship with the company either directly, or as a partner, shareholder, director or senior employee of a 
body that has such a relationship with the company; iii) has received additional remuneration from the company 
apart from a director's fee, participates in the company's share option or a performance-related pay scheme, or is a 
member of the company's pension scheme; iv) has close family ties with any of the company's advisers, directors or 
senior employees; v) holds cross-directorships or has significant links with other directors through involvement in 
other companies or bodies; vi) represents a significant shareholder; or vii) has served on the board for more than 
nine years from the date of first election. 
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second measure uses the assessment by Manifest of director independence, which applies the 
Code’s criteria strictly. Finally, Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) show negative stock price 
reactions to independent director appointments, when the CEO is involved in the nominating 
committee. We therefore construct a third measure of board independence which classifies 
directors as insiders if they are appointed after the appointment date of the CEO.
9
 We do not 
construct board independence measures for Germany, since the roles of the supervisory and 
management board members are legally separated. 
A final dimension in which board structures differ is that in Germany the representation 
that banks enjoy on the board is higher and more frequent, in line with the view that the German 
system is a bank-based financial system. To examine the role of bankers in CEO appointment 
and replacement decisions, we construct the ratio of board members that are affiliated with a 
bank. The information for this variable is available for a subsample of 114 German firms as used 
in Dittmann et al. (2010) and kindly provided by the authors, and from Manifest for all U.K. 
sample firms. 
 
3.2 Firm-level data 
Along with board composition data, we collect yearly shareholder data for all sample firms. We 
collect all shareholder stakes larger than 5% and aggregate them by blockholder in case an 
ultimate controlling blockholder holds several stakes directly and indirectly. For both countries, a 
company is considered widely held when no shareholder owns more than 25% of voting rights. 
Otherwise the firm is regarded as controlled by a block shareholder. We further classify 
blockholders by type into institutional investors, families, industrial blockholders, and others, 
                                                          
9
 Perry (2000) shows that incentive compensation for independent directors increases the likelihood of CEO 
turnover following poor performance. We have experimented by eliminating the third criterion in the U.K. 
Corporate Governance Code, and results remain unchanged. 
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where the latter includes non-family controlled foundations, the state, employees, and 
management). Shareholders are identified (and traced to ultimate blockholders if these exist) 
using Manifest and Hoppenstedt data, augmented by Factiva, annual reports and web searches. In 
addition to these variables we construct alternative versions that combine our data with the 
widely used data on shareholdings and ultimate ownership provided in Faccio and Lang (2002). 
Their data set has a slightly lower threshold (20%) of voting rights and therefore identifies 
additional blockholders. In these alternative versions we treat a firm as having a blockholder if 
our data or the Faccio and Lang data indicate that a blockholder exists. 
We also record time series of restructuring activities that take place at the firm level. We 
focus on asset and employment changes using Compustat and trace incidents of divestitures and 
acquisitions using SDC Platinum. 
Stock return data, adjusted for dividends and splits, are obtained from Datastream. To 
calculate abnormal stock returns, we use country specific Fama French risk factors compiled by 
Ang et al. (2009) and kindly provided by the authors. Finally, all accounting items are obtained 
from Compustat Global and deflated to US$ in 2000. 
 
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports sample summary statistics. As Panel A shows, firm size and profitability of firms 
in the U.K. and Germany are very similar. The median firm has total market capitalization of 
$280 million in the U.K. and $240 million in Germany, and return on assets of 13 percent in the 
U.K. and 12 percent in Germany. As previously stated, a primary reason for focusing on U.K. 
and Germany is that large institutional differences exist between the two countries, which are 
reflected in many firm characteristics, including leverage and shareholder structures. Median 
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leverage (total debt over assets) is 54 percent in the U.K. and 69 percent in Germany. The 
median firm does not have a blockholder with at least a 25 percent stake in the U.K., while it 
does in Germany. The largest shareholder controls 12 percent of voting rights in U.K. firms and 
52 percent in Germany. Following from this, the most frequent types of blockholders—families 
and financial firms—are present in 6 percent (families) and 4 percent (financials) of firms in the 
U.K., and in 27 percent (families) and 9 percent (financials) in Germany. 
 Moving to board characteristics, Panel B shows that these are similar across countries, 
with two exceptions. First, German boards are larger on average, primarily due to labor 
representation on the supervisory board.
10
 Second, separation of the roles of Chairman and CEO 
is mandatory in Germany. In the U.K. no mandatory separation exists, but the majority of firms 
choose to separate these roles.  
 Turnover probabilities in Panel C are almost identical across countries, with mean total 
turnover of 16 percent in the U.K. and 15 percent in Germany. External turnover, where the 
outgoing CEO leaves the board, is 11 percent in both countries. Internal turnover, where the 
outgoing CEO stays on the board, is 4 percent in both countries. Finally, new CEOs are typically 
insiders, in both countries. The likelihood of appointing an incoming CEO who has not held any 
position in the company previously is 34 percent in the U.K. and 30 percent in Germany.  
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
In this section, we test whether the threat of CEO turnover is credible and effective in the U.K. 
and in Germany and whether or not the quality of firm-level governance improves both relations. 
                                                          
10
 Under German codetermination regulation, 50 percent of the members of the supervisory boards of corporations 
are appointed by employees, see Mitbestimmungsgesetz of 4 May 1976. This applies for companies with more than 
2000 employees (for smaller companies mandatory representation is 30 percent, see Betriebsverfassungsgesetz of 15 
January 1972, replaced by Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz of 18 May 2004). 
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For the analysis we use our panel dataset over the period 1995-2005 that includes 812 CEO 
changes for 723 U.K. and 309 German firms. In Section 4.1 we first report results of a univariate 
analysis of the sensitivity of CEO turnover to past performance, where we introduce our four 
performance measures—return on assets (ROA), industry-adjusted return on assets (IAROA), 
control-group adjusted return on assets (CGAROA), and abnormal stock returns (AR). Then, we 
examine whether turnover sensitivities differ between the two countries in a multivariate analysis 
with additional firm-specific controls. Having established these baseline results, we turn to the 
analysis of the effect of CEO turnover on future performance in Section 4.2. In this analysis we 
explicitly address the possibility that operating performance is subject to unobserved 
heterogeneity and persistence in operating performance and use GMM-type panel estimators 
proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). We also provide evidence of the extent of corporate 
restructuring that follows CEO turnover and coincides with consequent performance changes. 
Finally, we introduce measures of firm-level governance quality and explore in detail whether 
the quality of governance in any way influences the sensitivity of turnover to past performance 
(i.e. the board’s firing decision) in Section 4.3, and the performance changes following the 
turnover (i.e. the board’s hiring decision) in Section 4.4. Finally, we explicitly test whether any 
differences exist across countries with respect to the importance of these governance 
mechanisms for the firing and hiring decisions taken by boards. 
 
4.1 Sensitivity of Turnover to Past Performance 
In Table 2, we examine how prior firm performance affects CEO turnover decisions. Under the 
effective monitoring view, CEOs should be relatively more likely to be replaced after poor 
performance. To test this, firms are divided into performance quintiles, where quintiles are based 
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on our four performance measure, ROA, IAROA, CGAROA and AR, and quintile cutoff values are 
determined per country.   
ROA is calculated as EBITDA over lagged total assets. IAROA is equal to ROA minus the 
the two-digit SIC code industry median. This industry median is determined using a minimum of 
three firm-year observations in the same two-digit industry. If less than three observations are 
available, the industry-median is determined at the one-digit industry level. IAORA is missing if 
less than three firm-year observations are available at the one-digit industry level. CGAROA is 
control group adjusted ROA, and follows the approach proposed by Barber and Lyon (1996) and 
previously used in managerial turnover studies by Denis and Kruse (2000) and Huson et al. 
(2004). This methodology compares the performance changes a given firm experiences 
following a turnover event with the performance changes of other firms in the same industry and 
with roughly the same performance in the year preceding turnover. More precisely, the control 
group adjusted change in ROA for firm i which experiences turnover is computed as: 
)( ikii GkROAMedianROACGAROA   
where Gi is the set of comparison firms for firm i in the year of turnover. This set comprises the 
firms which satisfy three criteria: i) The firm is covered by Compustat Global. ii) ROA is within 
±2  percentage points of ROA of the matching firm in the fiscal year preceding the turnover 
event. iii) The firm is incorporated in the same country and belongs to the same industry as 
company i. 
Comparison firms are in the same two-digit SIC code industry as firm i. If no matching 
firm in the same industry is found, the control group is defined at the one-digit SIC industry 
level. If no matching firm is found at the one-digit level, CGAROA is missing. 
The three operating performance measures, ROA, IAROA and CGAROA are measures of 
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short-term profits and therefore better predictors of CEO turnover than stock market returns, if 
the market incorporates future benefits of replacing an underperforming CEO. Stock price data 
and our measure of abnormal stock price performance, AR, may therefore underestimate the 
amount of monitoring by the board. At the same time, earnings data have many potential 
problems when used as profitability measures. Because of this we follow Weisbach (1988) and 
later studies and use both stock market based and accounting based performance measures. 
 Table 2 shows three main results. First, the sensitivity of external turnover to past 
performance is very similar between the two countries. In Panel A, moving from the highest to 
the lowest ROA performance quintile increases the likelihood of external CEO turnover from 9 to 
17 percent in the U.K., and from 8 to 14 percent in Germany. Using IAROA, the likelihood of 
external CEO turnover increases from 9 to 16 percent in the U.K., and from 7 to 16 percent in 
Germany. Results for CGAROA and market-based AR are very similar.  
Second, the increase in CEO turnover probability from the highest to the lowest 
performance quintile is statistically significant in all four panels (although significance is only 
marginal for CGAROA in Panel C), in both countries. Therefore, as performance declines, CEOs 
face an increasing likelihood of being removed by the board. 
Third, internal turnover does not vary with performance in either country. Recall that 
internal turnover indicates CEO turnover events where the outgoing CEO stays in the firm. The 
lack of sensitivity to past performance in this CEO turnover category confirms that if the CEO 
stays in the firm, the turnover cannot plausibly be a firing. Instead, many of these events 
correspond to turnover due to health, retirement and other reasons unrelated to performance, and 
do not represent meaningful turnover events in the spirit of our analysis. Therefore, in the 
remainder of our analysis we only consider external turnover events, and treat firm-year 
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observations with internal turnover events as firm years without turnover event. 
 These univariate results are confirmed by multivariate regressions in Table 3, where the 
dependent variable is whether (1) or not (0) an external CEO turnover occurs in a given firm 
year. All regressions include as additional control variables firm size (log of total assets), CEO 
age, and indicator variables for unknown CEO age, financial firms, and year fixed effects. 
Columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 include the previous four performance variables—ROA, IAROA, 
CGAROA, AR, while columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 additionally include an interaction of the 
performance variable with an indicator variable for firms incorporated in Germany. All 
performance variables have the expected negative coefficient, indicating that external CEO 
turnover likelihood increases as performance declines and all are significant at the 1 percent level 
or better. In contrast, the interaction term with the indicator variable for Germany is never 
significant, showing that the sensitivity of turnover to performance is never significantly 
different, even marginally, between the two countries.  
 
4.2 Post-turnover corporate performance 
To what extent does CEO turnover lead to improvements in corporate performance? To answer 
this question, it is necessary to distinguish turnover incidents in underperforming firms from 
those in normally performing firms. We expect performance improvements to be more 
pronounced in the former group of firms, where the likelihood of disciplinary turnover is higher. 
Operating performance however exhibits mean reversion: Firms with low performance 
experience larger performance gains than firms with normal performance do. As we have shown, 
turnover occurs more frequently in cases of poor prior performance. Neglecting this mean 
reversion may therefore overstate the performance benefits of CEO turnover. To correct for 
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mean reversion in ROA, we follow the previously described control group adjustment 
methodology proposed by Barber and Lyon (1996) in constructing CGAROA.  
Figure 1 reports operating and stock performance in the seven year period surrounding 
turnover events. For the pooled sample, which contains both normal and underperforming firms, 
operating performance, measured by ROA, IAROA, and CGAROA, is flat throughout the seven 
year period. Abnormal stock returns, AR, similarly remain roughly unchanged during the seven 
year window. When we consider poorly performing firms however, (i.e. firms in the bottom 
quintile of performance), we find that both operating and stock performance decline prior to 
turnover and reverse sharply afterwards. Patterns for firms in Germany and in the U.K. are 
similar.  
To quantify the significance of these effects, Table 4 reports the results of a univariate 
analysis of the effect of turnover on future performance. The median changes in ROA, IAROA 
and CGAROA, in the three years following the removal of the CEO, are 11.9%, 6.9% and 12.2% 
for U.K. firms and 7.9%, 5.5% and 6.9% respectively for German firms. These performance 
improvements are statistically significant at the five or at the one percent level, either 
considering the pooled sample, or the subsamples of  U.K. and Germany. Operating performance 
improvements are slightly less pronounced for Germany when operating performance is adjusted 
for mean reversion, but the U.K. and Germany are never statistically different from each other, at 
the 10 percent level. When we consider abnormal returns, we find that performance 
improvements are remarkably close: A median of 48% in the U.K. and 50% in Germany, with 
the difference again not being significant.  
These results provide preliminary evidence of post-turnover performance improvements 
for underperforming firms in both countries. However, two important issues regarding 
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unobserved heterogeneity and operating performance dynamics need to be addressed. With 
respect to the former, any unobserved firm characteristic that is positively correlated to both 
future performance and current CEO turnover would lead to an overstatement of the turnover 
benefits for underperforming firms. Regarding the second issue, mean reversion may still be 
present even after control group adjusting if ROA exhibits autocorrelation of order higher that 
one. We provide evidence below that this is indeed the case in our sample. 
To the best of our knowledge, neither issue has been addressed in the existing literature 
on post-turnover performance changes. By now standard econometric results (see Arellano and 
Bond (1991)) show that dynamic panel data models cannot be estimated consistently by the usual 
fixed effects estimators, since the set of regressors are by construction not strictly exogenous. 
Because of this, we make use of the GMM-type estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) 
and describe briefly its implementation in our analysis below. 
The model to be estimated is of the form: 
1 0 1 2 1 ,it it it it t i ity a a y a y x d              
where the dependent variable, yit+1, is future performance measured by ROA, IAROA, and 
CGAROA , xit is a vector of regressors, dt is a set of year dummies, ηi captures fixed unobserved 
firm heterogeneity, and εit is a white noise disturbance. We assume that 
        0i it it i it isE E E E         , for every  2 2, itt s E      ,  2 2itE      and 
 1 0i itE y    for every t>1. Letting it i itu     , the Blundell and Bond estimator is a linear 
optimal GMM estimator, it makes use of the orthogonality conditions:  , 0i t s itE y     for s>1, 
and  , 1 0it i tE u y    for 3t  . In the estimation procedure, the year dummies dt are treated as 
strictly exogenous, whereas the regressors  xit as predetermined. 
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Table 5 presents the estimation results that include year fixed effects and firm fixed 
effects.
11
 We define poorly performing firms (QLOW) as those in the bottom performance 
quintile. By interacting QLOW with a turnover dummy variable, we examine the effect of 
turnover on future performance separately for firms with poor prior performance and for firms 
with normal prior performance. In all regressions, additional control variables include  the log of 
total assets, the log change in total assets, the log of number of employees, and the log change of 
the number of employees. 
The coefficients of the interaction term of QLOW with CEO turnover are always positive 
and significant. The triple interaction with the indicator for Germany is insignificant in two out 
of three cases. The results indicate that in both countries underperforming companies enjoy 
performance improvements in all measures of operating performance, over and above all effects 
induced by mean reversion, firm growth at the year of turnover, unobserved firm heterogeneity 
and year-specific shocks. Despite their differences in governance characteristics, both financial 
systems are successful in implementing turnover decisions that reverse the course of poorly 
performing firms. 
The similarity between the two countries is further manifested when we examine 
corporate restructuring measures associated with turnover decisions. Table 6 shows that in both 
countries of our sample, a CEO change is followed by large asset sales and employment 
reductions, especially when turnover takes place in a poorly performing firm. This is consistent 
with the evidence in Weisbach (1995), who shows that CEO turnover leads to increased 
divestitures. For those firms, in the three year period following turnover, the median percentage 
change in asset size is -5.8% in the U.K. and -20.6% in Germany. Similarly the median 
                                                          
11
 Note that country fixed effects and firm fixed effects can be estimated separately, since a subset of the 
orthogonality conditions,  , 1 0it i tE u y   , makes use of the level rather than the differences of disturbances. 
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percentage change in employment is -15.1% in the U.K. and -15.2% in Germany. The case of 
Germany is especially noteworthy, since strong employment protection legislation and labour 
participation in the supervisory board apparently do little to block extensive restructuring after a 
CEO turnover event.  
 
4.3  Governance and CEO turnover 
How are CEO turnover decisions related to firms’ governance characteristics? We consider two 
broad dimensions of corporate governance: board characteristics and ownership characteristics, 
as well as price pressure from takeovers and financial leverage.  
We first consider the possible impact of governance quality on the sensitivity of CEO 
turnover to past performance. The results of probit regressions, where the dependent variable is 
CEO turnover, are reported in Table 7. In Panel A, lagged firm performance is interacted with 
board size, the three measures of board independence discussed in Section 3.1, the ratio of board 
seats occupied by bank executives and a dummy variable indicating separation between CEO 
and Chairman roles.  
If directorships matter for CEO monitoring, we expect the sensitivity of turnover to prior 
performance to vary negatively with board size and positively with independence and possibly 
banker representation on board. We find that the frequency of turnover is related negatively to 
board size and positively to two of the measures of board independence. This is robust to 
controlling for year effects, firm size, and excluding the case of board independence, country 
differences between UK and Germany. Remarkably, however, none of the board structure 
measures considered affects significantly the sensitivity of turnover to prior performance. In 
unreported regressions we also consider financial leverage as an alternative measure of lender 
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monitoring and governance quality, but do not find any significant economic effect. 
The results show that although board size and independence are relevant for assessing the 
variation of CEO turnover across firms, they do not explain the extent to which turnover is used 
as a disciplinary mechanism to prevent performance declines. In firms in which the roles of CEO 
and Chairman are separated, we find that CEO turnover is more frequent. This characteristic 
however, is unrelated to monitoring. The sensitivity of turnover to prior performance in firms 
with a Chairman/CEO role separation is insignificantly lower, rather than higher, compared to 
the rest of the firms.    
We obtain similar results when we consider the effect of ownership structures on 
disciplinary turnover in Panel B. Indeed, no corporate ownership characteristic, including the 
presence of a blockholder, the degree of ownership concentration, the extent of family ownership 
or institutional ownership is significantly related to either the frequency or the sensitivity of 
turnover to prior performance. These results obtain irrespective of whether we use ownership 
variables that are constructed using the Hoppenstedt and Manifest sources, or whether we use the 
alternative versions augmented with the Faccio and Lang (2002) data.  
We also consider the disciplinary effect of price pressure due to takeovers. As outlined in 
our hypotheses, we expect takeovers to increase the sensitivity of turnover to past performance. 
We use takeover data from SDC and measure price pressure by i) the number of completed 
takeovers in the two-digit SIC industry of the firm ii) the number of completed hostile takeovers 
in the two-digit SIC industry of the firm and iii) the number of announced (but not necessarily 
completed) takeovers in the two-digit SIC industry of the firm, always per country and per year. 
In unreported regressions we find that none of these variables however increase the sensitivity of 
turnover to past performance. 
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We conclude that although several governance characteristics are related to turnover 
frequency, they do not explain the extent to which turnover is associated with CEO disciplining. 
 
4.4  Corporate governance effects on post-turnover corporate performance 
If governance mechanisms do not consistently explain the likelihood with which poorly 
performing CEO is fired, do they explain which CEO turnovers lead to corporate turnarounds?  
To answer this question, we perform panel regressions that are similar to those in Table 5, where 
the dependent variable is future performance. Additionally, we now interact the measures of 
governance quality with a dummy variable indicating turnover in a low performing firm 
(Turnover x QLOW) in Table 8.  
In Panel A we examine how post-turnover performance, measured by industry adjusted 
ROA, varies with board structure, using a dynamic panel data framework.
12
 Consistent with 
Yermack (1996), we find that firms with large board size experience lower future profitability 
after controlling for firm size and growth. However, the interaction term between board size and 
turnover for poorly performing firms is insignificantly negative. Therefore there is little evidence 
that board size affects the dynamics of performance following a disciplinary turnover incident.  
The composition of the board of directors is also likely to affect the criteria of CEO 
succession. For instance, independent directors are more likely to favor external appointments 
than inside directors. In addition, independent directors have less of their human capital attached 
to a specific firm, which in principle could make their attitude more favorable towards 
candidates bound to implement cost-cutting measures after their appointment. Our evidence 
suggests that firms with higher board independence experience lower future profitability. This 
                                                          
12
 We re-run all 13 regression specifications in Table 8 with our alternative performance measures ROA and 
CGAROA. The results are very similar and do not yield additional insights, we omit them for brevity. 
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result does not contradict the idea that outsider directors perform a monitoring role, since it may 
well be the case that firms appoint outsider directors when tough periods are expected in the near 
future. However, we find that the presence of independent directors is associated with larger 
future profitability when a turnover decision is taken in a normally performing firm, and with 
lower future profitability when that decision is taken in a poorly performing firm. In that sense, 
independence is relevant for quality of succession in normally performing firms, but it is not 
related to successful corporate turnarounds.  
Regarding the effect of creditor representation on the board of directors, bank executives 
are clearly outside directors, and as such are less likely to agree with a succession plan that 
preserves private benefits of insider directors. Creditors however own a concave claim in the 
firm’s asset value, and are likely to distort investment decisions away from risky projects. Our 
evidence suggests that banker representation is weakly positively related to future profitability, 
following a turnover in poorly performing firms. This effect is statistically significant only at the 
10% level and therefore it is not a robust predictor of corporate turnarounds. In unreported 
results, we also test whether the relation between bank representation on board and post turnover 
performance varies with the financial leverage of the firm. The underlying idea is that creditor 
monitoring should be more pronounced when creditors have more ‘skin in the game’. Our results 
however do not support this hypothesis. 
We also examine whether separating the roles of CEO and Chairman is related to 
corporate turnarounds in the years following CEO turnover. Our evidence suggests that whereas 
poorly performing firms experience better operating performance in case the roles of CEO and 
Chairman are separated, those gains in performance are unrelated to whether the CEO is changed 
or not. Although the presence of a Chairman, as a director separate from the CEO, is potentially 
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an important governance tool for reshaping poorly performing firms, its role does not take effect 
through the selection of replacement CEOs.   
In a similar fashion, when we examine the effects of ownership characteristics on post-
turnover performance in Panel B, we find that some of these characteristics are in general related 
to performance. For example, family firms tend to have higher profitability, and firms with high 
institutional ownership lower profitability. However when we interact ownership characteristics 
with performance, we find no significant result, irrespective of whether the turnover takes place 
in a poorly or in a normally performing firm. 
In unreported regressions we also consider the possible effect of price pressure due to 
takeovers as in Table 7, and use the takeover intensity variables described there. We do not find 
any significant effects of price pressure on improvements in performance following CEO 
changes. 
At this point, the question emerges to what extent the above results may mask country 
specific differences? To address this, we re-examine in Table 9 how post turnover gains differ 
with board and ownership characteristics for each country separately. Our analysis excludes 
board independence and Chairman/CEO separation in Germany, since legal restrictions rule out 
any firm-wide variation in these measures (see section 3.3).  Confirming our earlier results, we 
find that corporate turnarounds following CEO turnover are not systematically related to 
governance variables either in Germany or in the UK, irrespective of the characteristic or the 
data source considered. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Our paper analyzes firm performance around CEO turnover events for a large sample of 5,300 
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firm-year observations from the U.K. and Germany. We investigate whether underperformance 
leads to CEO turnover (the sensitivity of turnover to past performance) and whether CEO 
turnover leads to future performance improvements (the sensitivity of future performance to 
turnover), and whether both relations are strengthened by better governance.  
 The striking result to emerge from our analysis is that the basic economic mechanism of 
replacing the CEO in an underperforming firm to achieve a successful turnaround, appears to 
work well and in nearly identical ways across very different financial markets. It also appears to 
apply in virtually the same way across firms with very different quality levels of governance. On 
the bright side, our results therefore suggest that in times of crisis, boards on average take the 
right decisions. They also suggest however that strengthening a specific governance mechanism 
in isolation will not have beneficial effects, at least with respect to firing and hiring the CEO.  
 One particular aspect of our analysis is the (lack of a) role of outsider-dominated boards. 
Prior U.S. evidence shows that boards are more likely to take the right decisions when they are 
outsider-dominated. We find that boards in the U.K. take similar decisions to those in the U.S., 
but it does not matter whether they are outsider-dominated or not. Further, even boards in 
Germany take similar decisions, where because of two-tier board structures there are no cross-
sectional differences in outsider-domination and substitute governance mechanisms do not 
matter either. Our evidence suggests that the beneficial effects of outsider-dominated boards are 
limited to the U.S., or that outsider dominance in U.S. boards may not be causal but only related 
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Figure 1: Firm Performance Around CEO Changes 
Firm performance around external managerial turnover events. Year 0 is the fiscal year during which the turnover 
takes place. ALL indicates all turnover cases, QLOW indicates turnover cases where the firm belongs to the lowest 
performance quintile in the year prior the event. Performance is measured by return on assets (ROA), industry-
adjusted ROA (IAROA), ROA adjusted by a matched control group of firms (CGAROA) and abnormal stock returns 
(AR). All performance measures are defined in Table 2. For each performance measure turnover events are restricted 
to those for which firm performance data is available for the full 7-year window centered on the turnover year.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics  
Summary statistics for the main variables used in the analysis, for the sample period 1995 to 2004. Sales and Assets 
are in billions of US$; Employees are in thousands; Leverage is total debt over total assets, for non-financial firms 
only; ROA is EBITDA over lagged total assets; Abnormal stock returns are risk-adjusted annual returns using a local 
Fama French three factor model, where returns are dividend and stock split adjusted and factor loadings are 
estimated using monthly returns over the 24 month period preceding the fiscal year; Large blockholder, family 
blockholder and financial blockholder indicate a blockholder with at least 25% of voting rights; Largest blockholder 
stake is the percentage of voting rights of the largest blockholder; Outsider ratio is the number of independent 
directors divided by the total number of directors, and a director is classified as independent only if he or she meets 
all criteria in the U.K. Combined Code on Corporate Governance; Adjusted outsider ratio is calculated as Outsider 
ratio, but treats all independent directors appointed by the current CEO as dependent directors; Firm-reported 
outsider ratio is the number of independent directors as reported by the firm divided by the total number of directors; 
Bankers on board ratio is the number of non-executive directors that are executives of bank over the total number of 
non-executive directors. External CEO turnover indicates turnover events where the outgoing CEO leaves the firm. 
Internal CEO turnover indicates a turnover event where the outgoing CEO stays in the firm. New CEO is outsider 
indicates whether (1) or not (0) a newly appointed CEO previously worked for the firm in any role. All accounting 
items are adjusted to US$ in the year 2000. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
Sample Full   U.K.   Germany 
 
N Mean Med. SD 
 
N Mean Med. SD 
 
N Mean Med. SD 
Panel A: Firm characteristics 
Market capitalization 5,279 2.58 0.26 11.68 
 
3,398 2.72 0.28 13.26 
 
1,881 2.31 0.24 8.07 
Assets 5,279 9.29 0.37 54.97 
 
3,398 7.23 0.32 48.26 
 
1,881 13.01 0.56 65.21 
Employees 5,279 11.65 2.08 29.82 
 
3,398 9.40 1.72 23.84 
 
1,881 15.70 2.98 38.00 
Leverage 4,732 0.60 0.60 0.23 
 
3,036 0.56 0.54 0.25 
 
1,696 0.68 0.69 0.16 
Return on assets (ROA) 5,279 0.13 0.12 0.13 
 
3,398 0.13 0.13 0.15 
 
1,881 0.12 0.12 0.09 
Abnormal stock returns 5,279 -0.05 -0.02 0.40 
 
3,398 -0.05 -0.02 0.43 
 
1,881 -0.05 -0.03 0.34 
Financial firm  5,279 0.10 0.00 0.30 
 
3,398 0.11 0.00 0.31 
 
1,881 0.10 0.00 0.30 
Large blockholder exists 5,279 0.46 0.00 0.50 
 
3,398 0.25 0.00 0.44 
 
1,881 0.82 1.00 0.39 
…that is a family 4,743 0.14 0.00 0.35 
 
2,883 0.06 0.00 0.23 
 
1,860 0.27 0.00 0.45 
…that is a financial firm 4,743 0.06 0.00 0.24 
 
2,883 0.04 0.00 0.20 
 
1,860 0.09 0.00 0.28 
Largest blockholder stake 4,770 30.59 17.39 28.17 
 
2,910 14.81 12.00 11.07 
 
1,860 55.29 52.07 29.06 
Panel B: Board characteristics 
Board size 5,279 10.38 9.00 5.65 
 
3,398 7.96 8.00 2.79 
 
1,881 14.74 14.00 6.77 
Executive directors 5,279 3.87 4.00 1.81 
 
3,398 3.89 4.00 1.73 
 
1,881 3.83 3.00 1.93 
Non-executive directors 5,279 6.51 5.00 4.87 
 
3,398 4.07 4.00 2.00 
 
1,881 10.91 11.00 5.41 
Outsider ratio, % 2,890 0.43 0.43 0.16 
 
2,890 0.43 0.43 0.16 
 
- - - - 
Adjusted out. ratio, % 2,890 0.19 0.14 0.20 
 
2,890 0.19 0.14 0.20 
 
- - - - 
Firm-reported. out. ratio, % 3,398 0.49 0.50 0.15 
 
3,398 0.49 0.50 0.15 
 
- - - - 
Bankers on board ratio, % 3,557 0.02 0.00 0.05 
 
2,806 0.01 0.00 0.05 
 
751 0.05 0.05 0.06 
CEO age 5,279 51.89 52.00 6.54 
 
3,398 50.99 52.00 6.68 
 
1,881 53.52 52.00 5.94 
CEO age unknown 5,279 0.14 0.00 0.35 
 
3,398 0.03 0.00 0.18 
 
1,881 0.35 0.00 0.48 
CEO/chairman separated 5,279 0.93 1.00 0.26 
 
3,398 0.89 1.00 0.32 
 
1,881 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Panel C: CEO turnover characteristics 
P(Total CEO turnover) 5,279 0.15 0.00 0.36   3,398 0.16 0.00 0.36   1,881 0.15 0.00 0.36 
P(External CEO turnover) 5,279 0.11 0.00 0.32 
 
3,398 0.11 0.00 0.32 
 
1,881 0.11 0.00 0.31 
P(Internal CEO turnover) 5,279 0.04 0.00 0.20 
 
3,398 0.04 0.00 0.20 
 
1,881 0.04 0.00 0.20 
P(New CEO 
outsider|Turnov.) 812 0.33 0.00 0.47   529 0.34 0.00 0.48   283 0.30 0.00 0.46 
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Table 2. Univariate Analysis of Sensitivity of Turnover to Past Performance  
This table reports CEO turnover frequencies in the U.K. and Germany, by performance quintiles. Performance 
quintiles are based on return on assets (ROA) in Panel A, industry-adjusted ROA (IAROA) in Panel B, control-group 
adjusted ROA (CGAROA) in Panel C and abnormal stock returns (AR) in Panel D. Quintile cutoff values are 
determined per country. ROA is EBITDA over lagged total assets. IAROA is ROA minus the two-digit SIC industry 
median ROA. If less than 3 firms are in the same two-digit SIC industry, the one-digit SIC industry level is 
considered. If less than 3 firms exist at the one-digit level, IAROA is missing. CGAROA is ROAi-
Median(ROAk|kGi), where Gi is the set of comparison firms for firm i. Comparison firms are in the same two-digit 
SIC industry as firm i and their performance in year t-1 is within ±2 percentage points of ROAi. If no matching firm 
in the same industry is found, the control group is defined at the one-digit SIC industry level. If no matching firm is 
found at the one-digit level, CGAROA is missing. Control groups are calculated for each turnover observation and 
kept constant for the three year period surrounding the turnover event. Abnormal stock returns are risk-adjusted 
annual returns using a country-specific Fama French three factor model, where returns are dividend and stock split 
adjusted and factor loadings are estimated using monthly returns over the 24 month period preceding the fiscal year 
Results of t-tests of differences in turnover likelihood between the top and bottom performance quintiles are 
indicated by *, **,*** and correspond to turnover likelihood differences being significantly different from 0 at the 
10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.  
Sample U.K.     Germany 
Quintile Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 t-test  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 t-test 
 lowest    highest Q1 vs. Q5 lowest   highest Q1 vs. Q5 
Panel A: Performance quintiles based on ROA 
P(Total turnover) 22% 14% 14% 15% 12% *** 
 
18% 15% 14% 17% 12% ** 
P(External turnover) 17% 11% 10% 11% 9% *** 
 
14% 12% 9% 10% 8% *** 
P(Internal turnover) 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 
  
4% 2% 5% 7% 4% 
 
Panel B: Performance quintiles based on industry-adjusted ROA (IAROA) 
P(Total turnover) 21% 15% 15% 14% 13% *** 
 
20% 14% 14% 15% 12% *** 
P(External turnover) 16% 11% 11% 10% 9% *** 
 
16% 10% 9% 11% 7% *** 
P(Internal turnover) 5% 3% 4% 4% 4% 
  
4% 4% 5% 3% 5% 
 Panel C: Performance quintiles based on control-group adjusted ROA (CGAROA) 
P(Total turnover) 19% 15% 14% 11% 16% 
  
17% 13% 16% 10% 12% 
 P(External turnover) 14% 11% 10% 8% 11% * 
 
12% 9% 10% 8% 7% * 
P(Internal turnover) 5% 4% 4% 3% 5% 
  
4% 4% 6% 3% 5% 
 Panel D: Performance quintiles based on abnormal stock returns (AR) 
P(Total turnover) 21% 16% 14% 13% 13% *** 
 
22% 12% 12% 16% 14% *** 
P(External turnover) 17% 12% 9% 10% 9% *** 
 
17% 8% 9% 10% 10% *** 
P(Internal turnover) 4% 4% 5% 4% 4% 
 




Table 3. Multivariate Analysis of Sensitivity of Turnover to Past Performance  
Probit regression results, the dependent variable is whether (1) or not (0) an external CEO turnover occurs in a firm 
year. All variables are as defined in Table 2. All regressions include year fixed effects. Standard errors are in 









                        
ROAt-1 -0.693*** -0.754*** 
         
 
[0.199] [0.180] 
         ROAt-1x(Germany) 
 
0.235 
         
  
[0.439] 
         IAROAt-1 
   
-0.670*** -0.740*** 
      
    
[0.188] [0.187] 
      (IAROAt-1)x(Germany) 
    
0.355 
      
     
[0.461] 
      CGAROAt-1 
      
-0.960*** -0.967*** 
   
       
[0.299] [0.361] 
   (CGAROAt-1)x(Germany) 
       
0.068 
   
        
[0.777] 
   ARt-1 
         
-0.404*** -0.438*** 
          
[0.059] [0.069] 
(ARt-1)x(Germany) 
          
0.106 






















































































Observations 5,279 5,279   5,279 5,279   3,605 3,605   5,138 5,138 
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Table 4. Univariate Analysis of the Effect of Turnover on Future Performance 
This table reports changes in firm performance following CEO turnover, for both the following one-year and the 
following three-year period. Performance is reported for All quintiles, i.e. the full sample of CEO turnovers and for 
QLOW, i.e. the subsample of CEO turnovers where firm performance is in the lowest performance quintile in the 
year prior to the CEO turnover event. Performance quintiles are based on ROA in Panel A, IAROA in Panel B, 
CGAROA in Panel C and AR in Panel D. Performance measures are calculated as described in Table 2. Difference in 
medians between the full sample and the QLOW subsample are tested using the Wilcoxon rank sum test in Panels A 
to C, and difference in means are tested using a t-test in Panel D.*, ** and *** indicate significant differences at the 
10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. 





















Diff All vs 
QLOW 
Panel A: Performance based on ROA 
            
Period 0 to +1 0.3% 3.6% *** 
 
0.2% 7.1% *** 
 
0.4% 2.7% * 
Period 0 to +3 2.2% 11.0% *** 
 
2.9% 11.9% ** 
 
1.1% 7.9% *** 
Panel B: Performance based on industry-adjusted ROA (IAROA) 
            
Period 0 to +1 -0.1% 2.9% *** 
 
-0.2% 3.9% *** 
 
0.0% 2.3% * 
Period 0 to +3 0.3% 6.8% *** 
 
0.6% 6.9% ** 
 
0.0% 5.5% *** 
Panel C: Performance based on control-group adjusted ROA (CGAROA) 
           
Period 0 to +1 0.2% 8.9% *** 
 
0.1% 9.4% *** 
 
0.3% 7.0% *** 
Period 0 to +3 0.7% 10.5% *** 
 
0.9% 12.2% *** 
 
0.0% 6.9% ** 
Panel D: Performance based on abnormal stock returns (AR) 
            
Period 0 to +1 11.1% 39.7% ***   14.5% 50.4% ***   5.9% 28.0% *** 




Table 5. Dynamic Panel Data Regressions of Firm Performance 
Blundell and Bond (1998) dynamic panel data regressions with fixed firm and year effects of the form  
1 0 1 2 1 ,it it it it t i ity a a y a y x d              
where the dependent variable, yit+1, is future performance measured by ROA, IAROA, and CGAROA. In the 
estimation, year dummies dt are treated as strictly exogenous, whereas the regressors xit are treated as predetermined. 
QLOW indicates whether (1) or not (0) a firm belongs to the bottom quintile of either industry adjusted ROA or 
abnormal stock performance in year t in columns (1)-(6). In all regressions, additional control variables include 
log(total assets), the log change in total assets, log(number of employees) and the log change of the number of 
employees. GMM standard errors are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate a coefficient significantly different from 0 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. 
Dependent variable: ROAt+1   IAROAt+1   CGAROAt+1   
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   




























































































 ROA 0.443*** 0.438*** 
       
 
[0.017] [0.017] 
       ROAt-1 0.024** 0.025** 
       
 
[0.011] [0.011] 
       IAROA 
   
0.401*** 0.398*** 
    
    
[0.018] [0.017] 
    IAROAt-1 
   
0.036*** 0.037*** 
    
    
[0.011] [0.011] 
    CGAROA 
      
-0.153*** -0.151*** 
 
       
[0.025] [0.025] 
 CGAROAt-1 
      
-0.141*** -0.138*** 
 
       
[0.022] [0.022] 

























Table 6. Corporate Restructuring Following CEO Turnover 
Corporate restructuring following CEO turnover is reported as the median change in employees (Panel A) and the 
median change in assets (Panel B), for both the following one-year and the following three-year period. All quintiles 
includes the full sample of CEO turnovers, QLOW includes CEO turnovers where firm performance is in the lowest 
quintile in the fiscal year prior to the CEO turnover event. Performance quintiles are based on IAROA. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance of Wilcoxon rank sum tests at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level.  



















Diff All  
vs QLOW 
Panel A: Percent change in employees 
          
Period 0 to +1 0.0% -5.1% ** 0.4% -4.8% ** -0.7% -6.1% 
 
Period 0 to +3 -2.0% -15.1% *** -0.4% -15.1% ** -4.3% -15.2% * 
Panel B: Percent change in assets 
          
Period 0 to +1 -1.7% -7.9% *** -0.4% -10.2% ** -2.6% -6.0% * 
Period 0 to +3 -0.3% -11.8% ** -1.7% -5.8% 
 





Table 7. Sensitivity of Turnover to Past Performance and Governance Mechanisms 
Probit regression results, the dependent variable is whether (1) or not (0) an external CEO turnover occurs in a firm 
year. Panels A and B include separate sets of governance variables and their interactions with performance. The 
governance variable is indicated at the top of each column. Each regression includes all firm-year observations for 
which the indicated governance variable is available. In Panel A, Board size is the sum of executive and 
nonexecutive directors in the U.K. and the number of supervisory board members in Germany. Outsider1 indicates 
whether (1) or not (0) the majority of board members are outside directors according to the U.K. Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance. Outsider2 is constructed as Outsider1, but treats all independent directors appointed by the 
current CEO as dependent directors. Outsider3 is constructed as Outsider1, but classifies director independence as 
reported by the firm. Bankers on board is the number of directors that are executives of a bank (independent of 
whether that bank itself is included in the sample), divided by board size. CEO/Chair separated indicates that the 
role of CEO and Chairman is split between two individuals. In Panel B, BlockholderM, Family blockM, and 
Institutional blockM indicate a blockholder with at least 25% of voting rights, constructed from manually collected 
data. Largest SH PerctM is the percentage of voting rights held by the largest shareholder, constructed from the same 
data. BlockholderFL and Largest SH perctFL are the corresponding measures based on data that additionally 
incorporate Faccio and Lang (2002). All regressions include year fixed effects. Standard errors are in brackets. *, ** 
and *** indicate a coefficient significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. 
Panel A: Board characteristics impact on the sensitivity of turnover to past performance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Board size Log(Board 
size) 




               
IAROAt-1 -1.536*** -2.383** -1.271** -0.681** -0.677 -0.734*** -1.160** 
 
[0.582] [1.107] [0.644] [0.280] [0.723] [0.188] [0.537] 
Germany -0.629*** -1.244*** - - - -0.254*** - 
 
[0.143] [0.295] - - - [0.064] - 
GOV Variablet-1 -0.042*** -0.394*** 0.852*** 0.161 0.914*** -0.350 0.217** 
 
[0.013] [0.103] [0.202] [0.167] [0.224] [0.223] [0.099] 
(GOV Vart-1)x(Ger) 0.046*** 0.478*** - - - 0.495** - 
 
[0.013] [0.122] - - - [0.242] - 
(IAROAt-1)x(Ger) 1.240 3.606 - - - 0.336 - 
 
[1.247] [2.691] - - - [0.498] - 
(IAROAt-1)x(GOV Vart-1) 0.103 0.830 1.602 0.572 0.325 -0.081 0.468 
 
[0.073] [0.558] [1.332] [0.926] [1.402] [2.497] [0.572] 
(IAROAt-1)x(Ger)x(GOV Vart-1) -0.125 -1.549 - - - 0.242 - 
 
[0.104] [1.105] - - - [2.747] - 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,255 5,255 2,876 2,876 2,876 5,279 3,397 









Panel B: Shareholder characteristics impact on the sensitivity of turnover to past performance 
 














IAROAt-1 -0.829*** -0.871*** -0.797** -1.149** -0.813*** -0.728*** 
 
[0.236] [0.295] [0.334] [0.476] [0.231] [0.223] 
Germany -0.348*** -0.193** -0.247** 0.017 -0.082 -0.115* 
 
[0.117] [0.083] [0.114] [0.117] [0.073] [0.069] 
GOV Variablet-1 0.065 0.056 0.001 0.004* 0.000 0.048 
 
[0.072] [0.089] [0.003] [0.002] [0.149] [0.178] 
(GOV Vart-1)x(Ger) 0.135 0.005 0.001 -0.006** -0.142 -0.190 
 
[0.133] [0.124] [0.003] [0.003] [0.176] [0.240] 
(IAROAt-1)x(Ger) -1.207 0.205 -2.433** -0.909 0.519 0.139 
 
[1.684] [0.824] [1.238] [1.157] [0.545] [0.501] 
(IAROAt-1)x(GOV Vart-1) 0.217 0.828 0.007 0.020 0.997 -0.477 
 
[0.387] [0.528] [0.016] [0.013] [0.847] [1.867] 
(IAROAt-1)x(Ger)x(GOV Vart-1) 1.560 -1.239 0.033 -0.000 -2.453* -0.911 
 
[1.767] [1.116] [0.024] [0.023] [1.387] [2.581] 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,279 5,279 4,246 4,246 4,224 4,224 




Table 8. Post Turnover Performance and Governance Mechanisms 
Blundell and Bond (1998) dynamic panel data regressions with fixed firm and year effects of the form  
1 0 1 2 1 ,it it it it t i ity a a y a y x d              
where the dependent variable, yit+1, is future performance measured by industry-adjusted return on assets, IAROA. 
The corporate governance variable is indicated at the top of each column. Panel A reports results for board 
characteristics, and Panel B reports results for shareholder characteristics. All governance variables are described in 
Table 6. QLOW indicates whether (1) or not (0) a firm belongs to the bottom quintile of IAROA. In the estimation, 
year dummies dt are treated as strictly exogenous, whereas the regressors xit are treated as predetermined. In all 
regressions, additional (unreported) control variables include log(total assets), the log change in total assets, 
log(number of employees) and the log change of the number of employees. GMM standard errors are in brackets. *, 
** and *** indicate a coefficient significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. 
Panel A: Board characteristics in dynamic panel data regressions  
 















IAROA 0.399*** 0.399*** 0.419*** 0.414*** 0.429*** 0.408*** 0.390*** 
 
[0.017] [0.017] [0.023] [0.023] [0.024] [0.021] [0.017] 
IAROAt-1 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.013 0.010 0.016 0.017 0.037*** 
 
[0.011] [0.011] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.013] [0.011] 
Turnover (yes/no) 0.001 -0.007 -0.062*** -0.038** -0.007 -0.004 -0.020 
 
[0.009] [0.019] [0.020] [0.015] [0.023] [0.006] [0.017] 
QLOW (yes/no) -0.018*** -0.019 -0.020 -0.018*** -0.005 -0.019*** -0.039*** 
 
[0.006] [0.013] [0.012] [0.006] [0.015] [0.004] [0.010] 
GOV Variable -0.002** -0.021*** -0.039* -0.061*** 0.013 -0.007 0.012 
 
[0.001] [0.007] [0.021] [0.017] [0.025] [0.053] [0.010] 
(Turnover) x (QLOW) 0.037*** 0.070** 0.109*** 0.064*** 0.062* 0.034*** 0.045* 
 
[0.013] [0.029] [0.029] [0.022] [0.034] [0.009] [0.025] 
(Turnover)x(GOV Var) -0.000 0.003 0.135*** 0.120*** 0.012 0.056 0.021 
 
[0.001] [0.008] [0.042] [0.037] [0.044] [0.106] [0.018] 
(QLOW)x(GOV Var) 0.000 0.003 0.010 0.026 -0.020 0.109* 0.028*** 
 
[0.000] [0.006] [0.025] [0.021] [0.029] [0.061] [0.010] 
(Turnover)x(QLOW)x(GOV Var) -0.002 -0.022* -0.167*** -0.109** -0.056 -0.180 -0.022 
 
[0.001] [0.013] [0.060] [0.054] [0.064] [0.145] [0.026] 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,279 5,279 2,890 2,890 2,890 3,557 5,279 





Panel B: Shareholder characteristics in dynamic panel data regressions  
 













IAROA 0.404*** 0.407*** 0.375*** 0.422*** 0.378*** 0.380*** 
 
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.021] [0.017] [0.017] 
IAROAt-1 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.023** 0.025* 0.020* 0.021* 
 
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.014] [0.011] [0.011] 
Turnover (yes/no) -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.001 
 
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.005] [0.004] 
QLOW (yes/no) -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.012** -0.015*** -0.014*** 
 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003] 
GOV Variable -0.010** -0.012** 0.000* 0.000 0.026*** -0.019* 
 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000] [0.009] [0.011] 
(Turnover) x (QLOW) 0.031*** 0.037*** 0.032*** 0.029** 0.022*** 0.025*** 
 
[0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.013] [0.007] [0.007] 
(Turnover)x(GOV Var) 0.013 0.011 0.000 0.000 -0.008 -0.010 
 
[0.008] [0.008] [0.000] [0.000] [0.012] [0.017] 
(QLOW)x(GOV Var) 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.005 -0.019 
 
[0.005] [0.005] [0.000] [0.000] [0.008] [0.012] 
(Turnover)x(QLOW)xGOV Var) -0.016 -0.029** -0.000 -0.000 0.018 -0.033 
 
[0.013] [0.013] [0.000] [0.000] [0.020] [0.028] 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,279 5,279 4,770 4,770 4,743 4,743 





Table 9. Post Turnover Performance and Governance Mechanisms By Country  
Blundell and Bond (1998) dynamic panel data regressions with fixed firm and year effects of the form  
1 0 1 2 1 ,it it it it t i ity a a y a y x d              
where the dependent variable, yit+1, is future performance measured by industry-adjusted return on assets, IAROA. 
The corporate governance variable is indicated at the top of each column. Regressions are identical to those in Table 
7, except that the full sample is split into subsamples of firms incorporated in the U.K. and Germany, respectively. 
The table reports coefficients and standard errors (in brackets) of the triple interaction (Turnover)x(QLOW)x(GOV 
Var). 
 Panel A: Board characteristics in dynamic panel data regressions 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Sample  Board sizet-1 Log(board  
sizet-1) 






-0.003 -0.029 -0.167*** -0.109** -0.056 -0.023 -0.017 
  
[0.003] [0.025] [0.060] [0.054] [0.064] [0.247] [0.029] 




0.000 0.003 - - - 0.161 - 
  [0.001] [0.017] - - - [0.233] - 
 Panel B: Shareholder characteristics in dynamic panel data regressions  
    (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)  
















-0.018 -0.040* -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.066  
  
[0.021] [0.024] [0.001] [0.001] [0.029] [0.046]  




0.006 0.010 0.000 0.001 -0.021 0.038  
    [0.022] [0.024] [0.000] [0.000] [0.017] [0.030]  
 
 
